Table 1. Casualties Allied (Entente) Nations Central Powers
Nations
Webs of trenches crisscrossed vast swaths of the countryside in France
and Belgium. Rail lines and roads were chewed up by the treads of mechanized
vehicles and other engines of war. Many cities, towns, and villages suffered
damage ranging from near total obliteration to minor combat damage. A notable
example is the French town of Reims. This small town, about 80 miles northwest
of Paris, was very nearly destroyed by German shelling and bombing campaigns.
At one point, in April of 1918, during the Second Battle of the Marne,
the German front pushed beyond Reims, to within 50 miles of Paris.
Figure 2. Outskirts of Paris, 1917
The very tone of land warfare changed during this period of the war,
because the German army had developed an "attack-in-depth" system of advance,
which paralleled its successful "defense-in-depth" approach to war on the
Western Front. Both avoided the over-emphasis in Allied thinking on breaking
or defending a rigid line. The new tactics called for sudden gas and artillery
barrages, to disrupt and demoralize the enemy, followed by the use of stormtrooper-like
infiltration advances. In March of 1918, the German army revived mobile
warfare. German columns again marched toward Paris.
Another case of massive destruction was the French city of Verdun.
One hundred and twenty miles east of Paris, Verdun came to be known as
the 'city that had resisted the German advance.' Despite massive attacks,
artillery barrages, and concentrated offensives, the German Army never
took Verdun. After the battle was over, there wasn't much left of Verdun
to take. Over half a million men were killed at the Battle for Verdun,
and on the first day of the assault, more than a million shells were fired
at French positions. The French Commander, General Joseph Joffre once had
stated, "I ask only one thing, and this is that the Germans will attack
me, and if they do attack me, that it will be at Verdun." The Germans promptly
obliged Joffre on February 21, 1916. The German Commander, Erich von Falkenhaym,
commenced artillery fire directed at the forts arrayed around the city,
on both sides of the River Meuse. Fort Douaumont fell on February 25. General
Phillippe Petain, Commander of the French Second Army took command of French
forces the following day. Falkenhaym then instituted a campaign of attrition,
and the battle rapidly devolved into a bloody stalemate. The defense of
Verdun became an emblem of French military might. Holding the city became
a symbol of the will of the entire French Nation. "They shall not pass!"
became the rallying cry. After the German advance was checked, the French
lines stabilized about 6 miles north of the city. The population of Verdun
had shrunk from approximately 15,000 to a little under 3,000. During the
campaign against Verdun, the city was very nearly destroyed by artillery.
Figure 3. Verdun, following German bombardment, February 23, 1916
Following the Allied Counteroffensive in the Fall of 1918, the German
army began to see the inevitable: The war was going badly, and there were
reports from the front of mass surrender and collapsing morale among German
troops. The leadership of Germany, both political and military, had eyes
to see that the war was over. This in no way indicated an end to the havoc
wreaked upon Western Europe by the Germans and their allies. The formation
of the Weimar Republic to lead Germany after the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm
II, sought an end to hostilities, primarily to "save face" for the German
people. Even while the new German Republic asked for the Armistice, one
last dying ember of the German war machine flared up. In the German retreat
from Northeastern France, the retreating army destroyed French coalmines.
The destruction of Belgian coalmines was also intended to be undertaken.
These and other actions did not earn the Germans great compassion or lenience
following the end of hostilities.
The End of the War, The Beginning of the Peace
Combat operations formally ceased at the eleventh hour of the
eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918. The German army had been driven
back from the front at Verdun, beyond Reims and St. Michel, and in the
north, past Arras, and Ypres.
Figure 4. Metz, France following the Armistice
Soldiers and their families rejoiced at the occasion, but did the war
really end at this point in history? The simple answer is yes, because
the struggle that had existed for the previous four years was no longer.
However, it must be considered that the reasons the war was begun had not
necessarily resolved. The business of making war was no longer a concern
for the political bodies of the combatant nations, and the business of
making the peace was now at hand. The Nations of War convened the first
session of the Peace Conference at Paris, France on January 18, 1919. Ironically,
this was the 48th anniversary of the proclamation of the German Empire.
Almost immediately problems arose. Almost 50 separate commissions and committees
were established to furnish information to the delegations. The plenary
sessions were open to all delegates and the difficulty of doing business
resulted in only eight plenary sessions being held. On January 23, the
Prime Ministers, and Foreign Secretaries of the five largest Allied powers
met, constituting the "Council of Ten." This body was still too unwieldy
to accomplish much, so American President Woodrow Wilson began meeting
with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, French Prime Minister Georges
Clemenceau, and Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando. They became known as
the "Big Four." The Big Four met 145 times, and accomplished much in the
way of detailing the treaties that ensued. The Germans were neither represented
nor consulted during these meetings.
The most important issues to the conferees at Paris were, to name a
few, French National security and German Boundaries; Reparations; Disarmament;
Condemnation of War Criminals; and The establishment of the League of Nations.
One of the major items to be dealt with was the revision of Germany's borders.
The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to French control was readily agreed
to by the delegations. The area of the Rhineland was under some dispute,
as the French wanted their frontier to reach to the Rhine River. The French
delegation demanded that the Rhineland provinces comprising ten thousand
square miles inhabited by over five million Germans should be made an independent
state, garrisoned by French troops. Lloyd George and Wilson were, initially,
not willing to accept relocating the German border to this point. A compromise
was then put forth. Germany was to retain sovereignty in the Rhineland,
but the region was to be demilitarized for a period of fifteen years, under
Allied occupation. Additionally, the United States and Great Britain were
to commit to an alliance to defend France against future German aggression.
France was not the only nation to lay claim to German territory. Belgium
gained the towns of Eupen, Moresnet, and Malmedy, though at no time had
any of these provinces ever belonged to either Belgium or France. Germany's
eastern frontier was no less easily determined, primarily since Wilson's
thirteenth point demanded the formation of an "independent Poland with
free and secure access to the sea." In order to satisfy this requirement,
the port city of Danzig was made an independent principality. Giving the
Poles access to Danzig was accomplished by creating a corridor of land
from Poland to the seacoast. West Prussia and Posen, (a small district
in eastern Germany) were given to Poland. Almost eighteen thousand square
miles were taken from Germany and made Polish territory. A total of 25,436
square miles of European land was seized from Germany and redistributed
to other nations. A further 2,933 square miles of German territory was
placed under the control of the League of Nations. Germany also lost
all of her colonies, which were redistributed among the victorious allies.
The Germans also lost territory to Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Lithuania.
Figure 5. Germany after Versailles.
Germany also was forced to divest herself of almost all of her Colonial
Empire. East and southwest Africa went to Britain; territory in the Cameroons
and Togo, to France; and the Far East colonies went to Japan, Australia,
and New Zealand.
Reparations were among the more important issues of the Paris Peace
conference delegates. Again, France was the most insistent of the delegations,
that Germany bear the sole cost of, and responsibility for, the war. By
the pre-armistice agreement, Germany was required to make compensation
for “all damages done to the civilian population of the Allies and their
property.” It was estimated that damages from combat operations totaled
$15-$25 billion dollars. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles stated:
“The Allied and Associated governments affirm and Germany accepts the
responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage
to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have
been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression
of Germany and her Allies”
The meaning of this statement was clear: Germany was to bear the burden
of paying the entire cost of the war. The date of complete fulfillment
was not even established by the drafters of the Treaty. France was in no
hurry to set a term of completion to the German obligations as set forth
in the treaty. In fact, France firmly and flatly refused to name a total
sum of Germany’s war debt. It was thought that figures decided upon at
the time of the treaty which were disproportionately high, might seem to
be rather moderate in twenty or thirty years time. The question of German
fulfillment of war debts and reparations was not without debate for many
years to come. Governmental officials from many countries labored for years
on the issue. The date of complete fulfillment of German war obligations
was finally (in 1930) set as March 31, 1988. How ironic that the demolition
of the Berlin wall began a mere 18 months after this date, on November
10, 1989, which was 71 years (less one day) after the signing of the Armistice.
Germany’s military forces were not to escape the vengeance of the Peacemakers
at Paris. The German army was to be limited to a total of 100,000 men.
This was less than 1/10 of 1% of the total number of German forces mobilized
at the start of the war, and less than 2% of the total number of German
Casualties during the war. Clearly, the conferees at Paris were insistent
on preventing Germany from ever again becoming a military power in Europe.
The German Navy suffered an even more ignominious fate. The entire German
fleet was to be scrapped. This was designed to assure British Naval Supremacy
in the North Atlantic for many years to come. Not the least interesting
effect of this idea was obviously the intent of preventing a future Battle
of Jutland from taking place. Another aspect of the Versailles Treaty was
that no German military or naval air forces could exist, including zeppelins.
Further, the personnel of the air forces had to be permanently demobilized
within two months of the Treaty being in force. In addition, all stores
of military aircraft and ancillary equipment were to be either destroyed
or given over to Allied control. Given the ferocity of the bombing campaign
carried out by the German aerial attacks, these terms were hardly surprising.
Various ideas were put forth as to how to punish Germany for her belligerent
behavior towards her European neighbors, and the War Criminals Punishments
was as good a beginning as any. Articles 227 & 228 of the Versailles
Treaty called for the Allied Nations to have the right to try War Criminals.
Many investigative committees were formed, among them the Bryce Committee
on Alleged German Outrages. This committee outlined crimes against humanity
committed by the German Army during the invasion of France and Belgium.
Not to be assumed to be entirely free of political motivation, and certainly
not without propaganda value, this report nevertheless documented dozens
of atrocities committed by German soldiers, during the course of combat
operations along the Western Front. The list of war crimes committed by
the Germans as outlined in the report describes the killing of non-combatants,
attacks on civilian women and children, the use of civilians as screens,
as well as looting, burning, and destruction of civilian property. The
report goes on to describe offenses against combatants in violation of
the Hague Convention of the Rules of Land Warfare of 1907. These included
Killing of enemy prisoners and wounded, firing on hospitals, and what the
report describes as, “the Abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.”
The conclusion of the Bryce Report states:
From the foregoing pages, it will be seen that the Committee has come
to a definite conclusion upon each of the heads under which the evidence
has been classified.
It is proved--
(I) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically
organized massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated
murders and other outrages.
(II) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians, both
men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated, and children
murdered.
(III) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of property
were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German Army, that
elaborate provisions had been made for systematic incendiarism at the very
outbreak of the war, and that the burnings and destruction were frequent
where no military necessity could be alleged, being indeed part of a system
of general terrorization.
(IV) That the rules and usage's of war were frequently broken, particularly
by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield for
advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded
and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White
Flag.
Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, the Committee
conceive that they would be doing less than their duty if they failed to
record them as fully established by the evidence. Murder, lust, and pillage
prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a scale unparalleled in any war
between civilized nations during the last three centuries.
Our function is ended when we have stated what the evidence establishes,
but we may be permitted to express our belief that these disclosures will
not have been made in vain if they touch and rouse the conscience of mankind,
and we venture to hope that as soon as the present war is over, the nations
of the world in council will consider what means can be provided and sanctions
devised to prevent the recurrence of such horrors as our generation is
now witnessing.
Article 231 held Germany to be guilty of having started the war, and
from this premise came the theory that the German Leaders were therefore
war criminals. Eight hundred and ninety German officials were cited for
crimes committed during the war. Of these charged, few were eventually
tried, and of those who were tried, only 6 were convicted, and they were
given light sentences. Kaiser Wilhelm II was himself to be tried for war
crimes. The Kaiser had fled to Holland on November 10, 1918, and the Dutch
refused to extradite him to stand trial. In the end, the Allies relinquished
their right to try war criminals.
Rebuilding Europe
The Peace Treaty forged in the cauldron of Paris was completed. On
April 27, 1919, the Allied notified the German government that they should
send a diplomatic delegation to receive it. The Allies still wished to
maintain exacting control over the vanquished Teutons. Rejections of several
delegations as “unfit” to receive the Instrument of Peace, were spitefully
made by the Allied delegates. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau
informed the Germans that they had three weeks in which to present a formal
statement outlining the objections to the treaty. There was precious little
debate over the issues. On May 29, the Germans presented their response
to the Allies. With characteristic German efficiency, the memorandum denounced
nearly every single point of the treaty. Facing further military action
from the Allies, who still maintained a force on Germany's frontier, and
the potential to strengthen the existing blockade and starve the Germans,
the war-weary government at Berlin was forced to accept the treaty.
At the end of the war, France was faced with the immense tasks of reconstruction
and repopulating the areas that suffered devastation from the war. Whole
towns were destroyed, and their populations were homeless and in many cases,
there were not even people living to return to these areas. Post-war euphoria
over the repulsion of the invading Bosche and victory of the Allies left
the assumption that the costs of the war would be borne by the vanquished
Germans. The Treaty forced upon the defeated aggressors made it almost
a certainty. What was not considered was that Germany was not actually
able to pay the enormous costs that would be demanded by the French. This
was a small point that was intentionally overlooked. The French came to
the conclusion that the Germans had started the conflict, and were defeated,
so therefore they were responsible for, and would be made to pay the costs
of, putting everything back together. A colossal task was facing the French.
How to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure on which a nation's economy
depended. First and foremost, those remaining industrial plants that had
been producing war materiel had to be shifted over to peacetime production.
This was accomplished relatively easily, but the dilemma of rebuilding
the factories that were destroyed still remained. The French economy depended
on the production of goods. The war had done a great deal to break up inertia
and resistance to change, especially in industry, and this gave the French
the opportunity to adopt new techniques of production, and new forms of
management. The recovery of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and the
acquisition of new colonies went a long way to speeding the recovery. The
European provinces, including the Saar Basin, formerly held by Germany
contained some of the richest coal mines in Europe, vital to the Industry
that was in need of resources.
Belgium faced similar difficulties. Over 241,000 acres of land had
been blighted by German shelling, and three-fourths of the rolling stock
of Belgian railways was destroyed. Over 6% of Pre-war stocks of merchandise
and other industrial products were lost as a result of combat operations.
The cost of rebuilding over 1,300 public buildings was placed at 75 million
francs. The damage done to highways, canals, and bridges and other similar
facilities was tabulated at over 1.6 billion francs. The Hoover Committee
for Relief in Belgium, or C.R.B as it came to be known, was tasked with
six objectives to rebuild war-torn Belgium.
These objectives were:
1) To build up our organization for purchase of overseas shipments
of supplies
2) To secure adequate agreements from the Germans to protect imported
and native supplies in Belgium and immunity from attack on our ships en
route.
3) To secure adequate agreements with the Allies for passage of our
supplies through the blockade and liberty of action to charter ships.
4) To organize the charity of the world.
5) To obtain financial support from the Allies and possibly from the
Germans.
6) To build up the organization of the Belgians for adequate distribution.
[of relief supplies]
Out of practical application, these objectives were slow in coming,
and the building of such an organization was not accomplished without slow
and painful experience. It took 5 years for the C.R.B. to wind up operations
in Belgium and Northern France. A total of over 5 million tons of supplies
were imported during this time. 3.8 million tons of foodstuffs were delivered
to occupied Belgium. Over $386,000,000 was spent by the Treasury of the
United States, in Government Subsidy to the Belgian relief program, and
another $34,000,000 was given in charity by the American people.
The Interwar Period
Public resentment over the ignominious defeat of Germany and the Central
Powers ran high in every corner of Germany. A wave of German Nationalism
coursed through the population, many of whom subscribed to the belief that
Germany had somehow been stabbed in the back by the politicians, and that
the Military commanders could have actually gone on to a glorious victory
over the Allies. The Weimar Republic had its share of troubles in the administration
of German government. Incessant demands from the victorious countries to
step up reparations and German popular resentment over almost every facet
of the Treaty of Versailles were always at the forefront of German politics
for the next decade. Rampant inflation devalued the German Mark, and this
seriously damaged the German economy. Public resentment at the Weimar Republic's
apparent instability came to a head in 1923, with the French invasion of
the Ruhr. The drain of German resources to meet the demanding schedule
of reparations repayments led to an overall drop in the amounts being repaid.
This was interpreted by the suspicious French as Germany attempting to
default on their Treaty obligations. The French decided to enforce repayment
by sending troops into the center of Germany's heavy industry. For eight
months, French troops occupied the region. Strikes, labor disputes, and
swaggering French soldiers generated a rising anti-France attitude throughout
Germany. The German Mark became increasingly devalued as a result of the
hardship imposed on the German economy by the French demands. The financial
collapse of Germany was complete, with a crushing inflation that caused
popular uprisings throughout Germany. One of these uprisings, in Bavaria,
was of ominous significance to the Future. A local politician by the name
of Adolf Hitler staged a meeting in a Bavarian beer-hall to announce the
beginning of the National Revolution. A march to the center of Munich followed
the next day, and after being broken up by civil police, Hitler was imprisoned
for “High treason against the Republic." Hitler’s formation of the National
Socialist German Worker’s Party was the impetus that Germans had been waiting
for, to allow the country to throw off the oppressive Treaty of Versailles.
The new Nazi government was installed at Berlin in 1933, upon the ascension
to the Chancellorship of Germany by Adolf Hitler. German President Paul
von Hindenburg’s appointment of Hitler to lead the Government heralded
the beginning of many years of turmoil. The Second World War had begun,
although no one knew it at the time. It took the invasion of Poland in
1939 to notify the world that the first war, the so-called “Great War”
had never really ended. It is of interest to note that Germany was neither
invaded nor occupied by the Allies, after the war had ended. This is one
of the reasons she was able to rebuild so rapidly. Obviously, with the
Germans not having to rebuild the physical plant and infrastructure of
their industry, the vast military and industrial buildup of the 1930s was
infinitely easier than that of other Western Front nations who were faced
with the task of literally starting from scratch.
Conclusions
The restoration of Europe to a Pre-World War I condition was never
really possible, despite the intentions of the drafters of the Treaty of
Versailles. The Empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia either
ceased to exist during or immediately after the war. It is not possible
to un-ring a bell, and the largest bell the world had ever seen (up to
that point) was rung from July, 1914 to November, 1918. No one at the Paris
Peace Conference realized that all that was really accomplished was setting
Europe up for another war. Historical hindsight is always 20/20, and it
is much easier to determine after the fact what led to, or encouraged an
event, or chain of events to occur, than it is to foresee what events will
take place.
France had a large historical enmity toward Germany, having suffered
the loss of territory to the Germans. A fear of invasion and an almost
neurotic desire for national security drove the French to demand Germany’s
near emasculation at the Paris Conference. France’s desire for self-determination
and desperate need for political self-control has remained a driving force
in Europe to this day. France is well known for her intransigence in dealing
with other nations where her own national pride, security, and control
are concerned.
Belgium gained no small measure of European and international respect
for her conduct in the Interwar period, and in the post-World War II era,
by not being nearly as vengeful as France was. The European Community and
NATO, as well as several other International, and European organizations
are headquartered in Belgium. Belgium also has an historical reputation
for repayment of her National Debts, stemming from her repayments of American
Relief monies and materiel as administered by the Hoover Commission.
Germany rose from the ashes of defeat like a terrible phoenix, in the
1920s to a zenith of power in the 1930s and early 1940s, which no other
European nation had achieved before, or since. It is lamentable that this
was at the cost of a totalitarian dictatorship that plunged the entire
world into another fearful conflict, and thus invited ruin upon herself
that more than made up for the devastation she wreaked upon her neighbors
in World War I. The word "Germany" did not appear on a map by itself for
nearly 50 years. It was only until the late 1980s that the concept of Germany
as a single nation was internationally accepted, or even permitted.
The reconstruction of Europe following the First World War took Europe
and the rest of the world into another war. After the end of the Second
World War, Europe built a booming economy that rivaled any other economic
system in the world. This economy was forged out of the building blocks
of reconstruction from the First World War. Lessons were learned, and prices
were paid, but the Nations of Europe overcame their conflict, their enmity
and their hostility and built a region that has great international prestige
and strength.
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