From: "Katherine Malm" <kmalm@earthlink.net>
Subject: Re: [CANSLIM] Now Xerox?
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 10:29:48 -0500
Next Article (by Author): [CANSLIM] Now Xerox? "Kelly Short"
Previous Article (by Author): Re: [CANSLIM] lighter side of corp deception KLall1112@aol.com
Top of Thread: [CANSLIM] Now Xerox? "Kelly Short"
Articles sorted by: [Date]
[Author]
[Subject]
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
- ------=_NextPart_000_000A_01C21E8E.BABAF880
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Here's some background on earnings from Briefing.com for those less =
familiar with EBITDA, etc.
- --Katherine
PS Xerox's accounting woes go back *years*.... P-U....
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
The Earnings Confidence Problem - Part I=20
25-Jun-02 14:18 ET=20
=20
[BRIEFING.COM - Robert V. Green] In the midst of the more =
scandalous market problems, the earnings confidence problem is not =
receiving the attention it should. Here is more on the topic.=20
The Market Problems
The current market suffers from the following ailments:=20
a.. Distrust of management - from excessive comp to outright =
fraud. Tyco is the best example.=20
b.. Distrust of accounting - Andersen=20
c.. Distrust of analysts - Blodgett
These three problems get all the press and attention.=20
But a deeper problem is afflicting the buy side - a growing =
concern about the validity of earnings reporting.=20
The Earnings Problem
Accounting rules have always been flexible enough to allow most =
companies a far amount of flexibility both in revenue recognition and =
expense recognition. Even when earnings reporting was somewhat =
standardized, some companies were criticized for how they recognized =
revenue and expense.
But in the last five years, the types of earnings that companies =
have driven Wall Street to focus upon have become questionable.=20
There are four different basic types of earnings today:
a.. GAAP earnings: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles - A =
standards board that publishes rules on how expenses should be booked. =
Generally, all types of expenses are deducted.=20
b.. As reported: Earnings excluding extraordinary items (as =
defined by GAAP), changes in accounting charges, charges related to =
discontinued operations (plant closings, etc.)=20
c.. Operating earnings: As reported earnings but excluding =
"one-time" charges which do not fit the GAAP definition of =
"extraordinary"=20
d.. Proforma earnings: Loosely defined "as if" analysis. =
Originally designed to provide comparison data for mergers.
GAAP accounting principles are guidelines for accountants, not =
investors. The GAAP standards are guidelines for how a company should =
keep its books, not how the company should report earnings.=20
For example, a basic principle behind GAAP is that revenue must be =
booked over the time period for which services and product are =
delivered. If a two year $200,000 contract is pre-paid in cash, up =
front, the entire $200,000 cannot be booked in the quarter in which the =
contract is signed. However, the revenue does not have to be booked as =
$25,000 per quarter for two years. A fair amount of flexibility, =
sometimes negotiated by auditors, is possible for how much of a contract =
can be booked in each quarter.=20
GAAP covers expenses as well as revenues, of course.=20
As reported earnings are the historical standard for earnings. =
Until the mid-eighties, in fact, there was little debate over how =
earnings should be reported as everyone used "as reported" earnings as a =
standard. For the most part, there was no difference between "as =
reported" earnings and any other methodology because one-time charges =
were not as common. Furthermore, companies did not actively seek, as =
they do today, to have certain expenses classified as "one-time."=20
Operating earnings are designed to allow comparisons between =
quarters and years for a company. One time charges in any quarter are =
excluded because these would distort the comparison. Operating earnings =
became important when it became clear that Wall Street would completely =
ignore any "one-time" charges, and focus solely on earnings growth. This =
provided a strong incentive for companies to classify large expenses as =
one-time charges.=20
An example of one company's aggressive attempt to get charges =
classified as one-time was Excite's 1997 $40 million marketing deal with =
Netscape. Now long forgotten, Excite paid Netscape up-front for a =
four-year deal to be the principal search engine at the Netscape web =
site. Excite tried to classify the entire $40 million payment as a =
one-time charge in a single quarter. By doing so, Excite was almost =
profitable. At Briefing we highlighted this event as an indicator of the =
times. The SEC later forced Excite to restate the payment as a four-year =
expense. But many, many companies were successful in getting major =
expense outlays classified as "one-time" which improved income =
statements.=20
The focus on operating expenses led to the development of the =
"EBITDA" concept, which is "Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, =
Depreciation, and Amortization." The EBITDA concept, which has to be =
calculated from the line items shown on an operating earnings report, =
was designed to show the basic business model of the company, without =
regard to cost-of-capital. If capital were free, then EBITDA would be =
earnings.=20
The focus on EBITDA has fallen from favor in recent times for one =
single reason: Interest. The interest payments on bonds, which are =
excluded from EBITDA calculations, has ruined many debt-ridden.=20
Only through focusing on EBITDA projections could a company like =
Exodus Communications raise so much debt that their interest payments =
exceeded their gross margin. That won't happen again for decades.=20
Pro-forma earnings are very hard to define today. The original =
purpose of pro-forma earnings calculations was to show the effects of a =
merger in a format that allowed a single income statement to combine =
only the operating models of each company, and exclude the actual costs =
of making the merger.=20
Under the pro-forma for merger guidelines, pro-forma calculations =
could only be used for one year, after which the company should start =
reporting as-reported earnings for the combined entities.=20
However, companies soon learned that as long as they made a new =
merger each year, they could continue reporting pro-forma earnings =
indefinitely. This "flexibility" in how earnings could be reported led =
to "pro-forma" meanings that were never intended, including stock option =
compensation expenses and R&D "in-progress" write-offs.=20
The Erosion of Earnings Confidence
The now long-departed CFO of Amazon.com, Joy Covey, was the unsung =
hero of bringing pro-forma earnings to the popularity they enjoyed. She =
did so by diverting attention away from standardized earnings reports.=20
Ms. Covey invented the concept of "EBITMA" which was defined =
"EBITDA plus marketing." She was successful in convincing Wall Street =
that marketing costs were equivalent to capital investment, a concept =
which looks ridiculous in retrospect. But in the early days of the =
internet, marketing and brand development was equated with capturing =
"territory" which, presumably, everyone thought could never be lost. =
(Tell that to investors in Excite.)=20
Nevertheless, Joy Covey was successful in convincing investors, =
particularly convertible bond investors, to focus on the EBITMA concept. =
It was a crucial element in selling the $2 billion in Amazon.com bonds =
that built the company. After all, if you ignore the interest payments =
on the bond, and you consider spending the bond principal on marketing =
as "not an expense," Amazon's income statement would look great!.=20
The problem, of course, is that bond holders don't care about =
earnings statements. They just care about the payments. The jury is =
still out on whether Amazon.com will eventually be able to pay the =
principal on their bonds. (See the Stock Brief of: 14-May-01 =
Amazon.com's Bond Problem.=20
After Joy Covey established the principle of EBITMA, internet =
companies began using all types of non-earnings related statistics to =
show growth. Page views, registered users, unique monthly visitors are =
just some of the meaningless examples that became popular. (Surely you =
remember.)
When "non-revenue statistics" becoming drivers of stock prices, =
(around 1998) pro-forma earnings increased in popularity. After all, a =
pro-forma income statement that showed some kind of earnings progress =
looked a lot more "real" than the phony statistics being coughed up by =
internet companies.=20
But when the bubble collapsed, everyone began questioning earnings =
quality. It didn't happen overnight, and it didn't happen all at once. =
But as a long, slow evolutionary force, earnings confidence has eroded, =
and is still present today.=20
The Aftermath
The evolution of earnings focus over the past 10 years has led us =
to today's situation: a basic lack of confidence in many companies =
income statements.=20
Amazon.com still reports earnings on a pro-forma basis. In their =
Q1 income statement, you can take your choice of earnings:=20
a.. Pro-forma: $25 million profit=20
b.. Operating: $2 million profit=20
c.. Net (as-reported): $(23) million loss
The earnings format you choose is not relevant, frankly. It is far =
more important to the stock value what format the guy next to you =
chooses.
After all, value to you is primarily determined by what someone =
else will pay, not by what you pay.=20
Even GE
Even solid companies like General Electric have come under =
scrutiny because of the extremely complex financial situations. =
Unraveling a GE earnings report has now become a major task. Where GE =
only had to beat earnings estimates by $0.01 each quarter to count on an =
ever increasing stock price, today that is not enough.
GE stock is down 50% in the last two years despite having only =
missed one earnings estimate in the last four years and having continual =
year-over-year growth in earnings averaging 15%.=20
This bears repeating: GE, as representative a stock as you can get =
of the overall economy, is down 50% since September 2000. During that =
time period, they have grown earnings at over 11% (year-to-year basis) =
and beat or met earnings estimates every quarter except one. The one =
shortfall was October 2001, the quarter of the Attack on America and GE =
was only one penny short.=20
Why can't GE get any respect? The only definable long-term culprit =
is a decline in confidence in GE's earnings numbers. During the same =
eight quarter time-period, GE revenue growth rate has been consistently =
falling. From a growth rate of 24% and 20% in 00Q1 and 00Q2, growth has =
steadily fallen, and even was negative for most of 2001.=20
Flat or declining revenue combined with continuing increasing =
earnings leads to only one conclusion: you can't keep this up forever. =
Eventually, GE will be unable to book the earnings number higher than =
previous years. When (if), that happens, GE stock will be further =
devastated. Until then, the slow erosion of confidence causes the stock =
price to decline.
GE is just one good example of how confidence in earnings numbers =
has been eroding over time since the bubble collapse. Until greater =
confidence in earnings numbers is established, you can expect further =
difficulties in the market overall.=20
Standard & Poors is now pushing for a standardized calculation for =
earnings reporting, called Core Earnings. We will have more on this =
concept in Part II of this story, to appear later this week.
Comments may be emailed to the author, Robert V. Green, at =
rvgreen@briefing.com=20
=20
----- Original Message -----=20
From: Winston Little=20
To: canslim@lists.xmission.com=20
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2002 9:47 AM
Subject: Re: [CANSLIM] Now Xerox?
They all used EBITDA.. which Warren Buffett in May said is the =
currency of a
crook ... they all have a smell about them.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Kelly Short" <kelly.short@neoris.com>
To: <canslim@lists.xmission.com>
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2002 9:46 AM
Subject: [CANSLIM] Now Xerox?
Enron, WorldCom- nothing. Xerox off by $6B. (Yes- that's "B" as in =
boy!)
Kelly
- ------=_NextPart_000_000A_01C21E8E.BABAF880
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2600.0" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV>Here's some background on earnings from Briefing.com for those =
less=20
familiar with EBITDA, etc.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>--Katherine</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>PS Xerox's accounting woes go back *years*.... P-U....</DIV>
<DIV>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>
<TABLE cellSpacing=3D0 cellPadding=3D4 width=3D"100%">
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD class=3Dheader>The Earnings Confidence Problem - Part =
I</TD></TR>
<TR>
<TD><FONT class=3Ddate face=3DVerdana =
size=3D1><STRONG>25-Jun-02 14:18=20
ET</STRONG></FONT></TD></TR>
<TR>
<TD height=3D8><STRONG><FONT face=3DVerdana =
size=3D1></FONT></STRONG></TD></TR>
<TR>
<TD>
<P>[BRIEFING.COM - Robert V. Green] In the midst of the more =
scandalous=20
market problems, the earnings confidence problem is not receiving =
the=20
attention it should. Here is more on the topic. </P>
<H3>The Market Problems</H3>
<P>The current market suffers from the following ailments: </P>
<UL>
<LI>Distrust of management - from excessive comp to outright =
fraud. Tyco=20
is the best example.=20
<LI>Distrust of accounting - Andersen=20
<LI>Distrust of analysts - Blodgett</LI></UL>
<P>These three problems get all the press and attention. </P>
<P>But a deeper problem is afflicting the buy side - a growing =
concern=20
about the validity of earnings reporting. </P>
<H3>The Earnings Problem</H3>
<P>Accounting rules have always been flexible enough to allow most =
companies a far amount of flexibility both in revenue recognition =
and=20
expense recognition. Even when earnings reporting was somewhat=20
standardized, some companies were criticized for how they =
recognized=20
revenue and expense.</P>
<P>But in the last five years, the <I>types</I> of earnings that =
companies=20
have driven Wall Street to focus upon have become questionable. =
</P>
<P>There are four different basic types of earnings today:</P>
<UL>
<LI>GAAP earnings: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles - A=20
standards board that publishes rules on how expenses should be =
booked.=20
Generally, all types of expenses are deducted.=20
<LI>As reported: Earnings excluding extraordinary items (as =
defined by=20
GAAP), changes in accounting charges, charges related to =
discontinued=20
operations (plant closings, etc.)=20
<LI>Operating earnings: As reported earnings but excluding =
"one-time"=20
charges which do not fit the GAAP definition of "extraordinary"=20
<LI>Proforma earnings: Loosely defined "as if" analysis. =
Originally=20
designed to provide comparison data for mergers.</LI></UL>
<P><B>GAAP</B> accounting principles are guidelines for =
accountants, not=20
investors. The GAAP standards are guidelines for how a company =
should keep=20
its books, not how the company should report earnings. </P>
<P>For example, a basic principle behind GAAP is that revenue must =
be=20
booked over the time period for which services and product are =
delivered.=20
If a two year $200,000 contract is pre-paid in cash, up front, the =
entire=20
$200,000 cannot be booked in the quarter in which the contract is =
signed.=20
However, the revenue does not have to be booked as $25,000 per =
quarter for=20
two years. A fair amount of flexibility, sometimes negotiated by =
auditors,=20
is possible for how much of a contract can be booked in each =
quarter. </P>
<P>GAAP covers expenses as well as revenues, of course. </P>
<P><B>As reported</B> earnings are the historical standard for =
earnings.=20
Until the mid-eighties, in fact, there was little debate over how =
earnings=20
should be reported as everyone used "as reported" earnings as a =
standard.=20
For the most part, there was no difference between "as reported" =
earnings=20
and any other methodology because one-time charges were not as =
common.=20
Furthermore, companies did not actively seek, as they do today, to =
have=20
certain expenses classified as "one-time." </P>
<P><B>Operating earnings</B> are designed to allow comparisons =
between=20
quarters and years for a company. One time charges in any quarter =
are=20
excluded because these would distort the comparison. Operating =
earnings=20
became important when it became clear that Wall Street would =
completely=20
ignore any "one-time" charges, and focus solely on earnings =
growth. This=20
provided a strong incentive for companies to classify large =
expenses as=20
one-time charges. </P>
<P>An example of one company's aggressive attempt to get charges=20
classified as one-time was Excite's 1997 $40 million marketing =
deal with=20
Netscape. Now long forgotten, Excite paid Netscape up-front for a=20
four-year deal to be the principal search engine at the Netscape =
web site.=20
Excite tried to classify the entire $40 million payment as a =
one-time=20
charge in a single quarter. By doing so, Excite was almost =
profitable. At=20
Briefing we highlighted this event as an indicator of the times. =
The SEC=20
later forced Excite to restate the payment as a four-year expense. =
But=20
many, many companies were successful in getting major expense =
outlays=20
classified as "one-time" which improved income statements. </P>
<P>The focus on operating expenses led to the development of the =
"EBITDA"=20
concept, which is "Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, =
and=20
Amortization." The EBITDA concept, which has to be calculated from =
the=20
line items shown on an operating earnings report, was designed to =
show the=20
basic business model of the company, without regard to =
cost-of-capital. If=20
capital were free, then EBITDA would be earnings. </P>
<P>The focus on EBITDA has fallen from favor in recent times for =
one=20
single reason: <I>Interest.</I> The interest payments on bonds, =
which are=20
excluded from EBITDA calculations, has ruined many debt-ridden. =
</P>
<P>Only through focusing on EBITDA projections could a company =
like Exodus=20
Communications raise so much debt that their interest payments =
exceeded=20
their gross margin. That won't happen again for decades. </P>
<P><B>Pro-forma earnings</B> are very hard to define today. The =
original=20
purpose of pro-forma earnings calculations was to show the effects =
of a=20
merger in a format that allowed a single income statement to =
combine only=20
the operating models of each company, and exclude the actual costs =
of=20
making the merger. </P>
<P>Under the pro-forma for merger guidelines, pro-forma =
calculations could=20
only be used for one year, after which the company should start =
reporting=20
as-reported earnings for the combined entities. </P>
<P>However, companies soon learned that as long as they made a new =
merger=20
each year, they could continue reporting pro-forma earnings =
indefinitely.=20
This "flexibility" in how earnings could be reported led to =
"pro-forma"=20
meanings that were never intended, including stock option =
compensation=20
expenses and R&D "in-progress" write-offs. </P>
<H3>The Erosion of Earnings Confidence</H3>
<P>The now long-departed CFO of Amazon.com, Joy Covey, was the =
unsung hero=20
of bringing pro-forma earnings to the popularity they enjoyed. She =
did so=20
by diverting attention away from standardized earnings reports. =
</P>
<P>Ms. Covey invented the concept of "EBITMA" which was defined =
"EBITDA=20
plus marketing." She was successful in convincing Wall Street that =
<I>marketing costs were equivalent to capital investment,</I> a =
concept=20
which looks ridiculous in retrospect. But in the early days of the =
internet, marketing and brand development was equated with =
capturing=20
"territory" which, presumably, everyone thought could never be =
lost. (Tell=20
that to investors in Excite.) </P>
<P>Nevertheless, Joy Covey was successful in convincing investors, =
particularly convertible bond investors, to focus on the EBITMA =
concept.=20
It was a crucial element in selling the $2 billion in Amazon.com =
bonds=20
that built the company. After all, if you ignore the interest =
payments on=20
the bond, and you consider spending the bond principal on =
marketing as=20
"not an expense," Amazon's income statement would look great!. =
</P>
<P>The problem, of course, is that bond holders don't care about =
earnings=20
statements. They just care about the payments. The jury is still =
out on=20
whether Amazon.com will eventually be able to pay the principal on =
their=20
bonds. (See the Stock Brief of: <A=20
=
href=3D"http://www.briefing.com/scripts/sub/stocks/PowerAnchor.asp?varArt=
icleID=3DSB20010514082806rvgreen">14-May-01=20
Amazon.com's Bond Problem.</A> </P>
<P>After Joy Covey established the principle of EBITMA, internet =
companies=20
began using all types of non-earnings related statistics to show =
growth.=20
Page views, registered users, unique monthly visitors are just =
some of the=20
meaningless examples that became popular. (Surely you =
remember.)</P>
<P>When "non-revenue statistics" becoming drivers of stock prices, =
(around=20
1998) pro-forma earnings increased in popularity. After all, a =
pro-forma=20
income statement that showed <I>some kind of earnings</I> progress =
looked=20
a lot more "real" than the phony statistics being coughed up by =
internet=20
companies. </P>
<P>But when the bubble collapsed, <I>everyone </I>began =
questioning=20
earnings quality. It didn't happen overnight, and it didn't happen =
all at=20
once. But as a long, slow evolutionary force, earnings confidence =
has=20
eroded, and is still present today. </P>
<H3>The Aftermath</H3>
<P>The evolution of earnings focus over the past 10 years has led =
us to=20
today's situation: a basic lack of confidence in many companies =
income=20
statements. </P>
<P>Amazon.com still reports earnings on a pro-forma basis. In =
their Q1=20
income statement, you can take your choice of earnings: </P>
<UL>
<LI>Pro-forma: $25 million profit=20
<LI>Operating: $2 million profit=20
<LI>Net (as-reported): $(23) million loss</LI></UL>
<P>The earnings format <I>you choose</I> is not relevant, frankly. =
It is=20
far more important to the stock value what format <I>the guy next =
to you=20
chooses.</I></P>
<P>After all, value <I>to you</I> is primarily determined by what =
someone=20
else will pay, not by what you pay. </P>
<H3>Even GE</H3>
<P>Even solid companies like General Electric have come under =
scrutiny=20
because of the extremely complex financial situations. Unraveling =
a GE=20
earnings report has now become a major task. Where GE only had to =
beat=20
earnings estimates by $0.01 each quarter to count on an ever =
increasing=20
stock price, today that is not enough.</P>
<P><I>GE stock is down 50% in the last two years despite having =
only=20
missed one earnings estimate in the last four years and having =
continual=20
year-over-year growth in earnings averaging 15%. </I></P>
<P>This bears repeating: GE, as representative a stock as you can =
get of=20
the overall economy, is down 50% since September 2000. During that =
time=20
period, they have grown earnings at over 11% (year-to-year basis) =
and beat=20
or met earnings estimates every quarter except one. The one =
shortfall was=20
October 2001, the quarter of the Attack on America and GE was only =
one=20
penny short. </P>
<P>Why can't GE get any respect? The only definable long-term =
culprit is a=20
decline in confidence in GE's earnings numbers. During the same =
eight=20
quarter time-period, GE revenue growth rate has been consistently =
falling.=20
From a growth rate of 24% and 20% in 00Q1 and 00Q2, growth has =
steadily=20
fallen, and even was negative for most of 2001. </P>
<P>Flat or declining revenue combined with continuing increasing =
earnings=20
leads to only one conclusion: <I>you can't keep this up forever.=20
</I>Eventually, GE will be unable to book the earnings number =
higher than=20
previous years. When (if), that happens, GE stock will be further=20
devastated. Until then, the slow erosion of confidence causes the =
stock=20
price to decline.</P>
<P>GE is just one good example of how confidence in earnings =
numbers has=20
been eroding over time since the bubble collapse. Until greater =
confidence=20
in earnings numbers is established, you can expect further =
difficulties in=20
the market overall. </P>
<P>Standard & Poors is now pushing for a standardized =
calculation for=20
earnings reporting, called Core Earnings. We will have more on =
this=20
concept in Part II of this story, to appear later this week.</P>
<P>Comments may be emailed to the author, Robert V. Green, at <A=20
href=3D"mailto:rvgreen@briefing.com">rvgreen@briefing.com</A>=20
<!--(RVG)--></P></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; =
BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: =
black"><B>From:</B>=20
<A title=3Dwlittle1@peoplepc.com =
href=3D"mailto:wlittle1@peoplepc.com">Winston=20
Little</A> </DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A =
title=3Dcanslim@lists.xmission.com=20
=
href=3D"mailto:canslim@lists.xmission.com">canslim@lists.xmission.com</A>=
</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Friday, June 28, 2002 =
9:47 AM</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> Re: [CANSLIM] Now =
Xerox?</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>They all used EBITDA.. which Warren Buffett in May said =
is the=20
currency of a<BR>crook ... they all have a smell about =
them.<BR><BR>-----=20
Original Message -----<BR>From: "Kelly Short" <<A=20
=
href=3D"mailto:kelly.short@neoris.com">kelly.short@neoris.com</A>><BR>=
To:=20
<<A=20
=
href=3D"mailto:canslim@lists.xmission.com">canslim@lists.xmission.com</A>=
><BR>Sent:=20
Friday, June 28, 2002 9:46 AM<BR>Subject: [CANSLIM] Now=20
Xerox?<BR><BR><BR>Enron, WorldCom- nothing. Xerox off by $6B. (Yes- =
that's "B"=20
as in boy!)<BR><BR>Kelly<BR><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>
- ------=_NextPart_000_000A_01C21E8E.BABAF880--
- -
- -To subscribe/unsubscribe, email "majordomo@xmission.com"
- -In the email body, write "subscribe canslim" or
- -"unsubscribe canslim". Do not use quotes in your email.
Next Article (by Author): [CANSLIM] Now Xerox? "Kelly Short"
Previous Article (by Author): Re: [CANSLIM] lighter side of corp deception KLall1112@aol.com
Top of Thread: [CANSLIM] Now Xerox? "Kelly Short"
Articles sorted by: [Date]
[Author]
[Subject]