Go to Jeff Salisbury LWGate Home Page.From: "Rocky Sanghvi" <rs@mylodestar.com>
Subject: RE: [CANSLIM] Now Xerox?
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2002 16:23:28 -0400
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Sam,
I agree with you with one exception. Capitulation and Fear seem to work
only in 'Bull' Markets. In a true bear, like the one we're in, it will be
like bleeding with a thousand cuts. It will go on and on until no one gives
a crap anymore. Look at all the times before, when we had thought
confirmation of the magical (2-5 day) FT. My gut tells me to Watch out for
the coming earnings season - for some pleasant but a lot more NASTY
surprises.
Also on a side note, does anyone care about CFOs managing earnings to the
downside? Meaning specifically guiding lower in a bad market with the
intention of beating and bloating future quarterly earnings? Have there
been specific cases? Microsoft has consistently been accused of 'managing
earnings.'
Rocky
- -----Original Message-----
From: owner-canslim@lists.xmission.com
[mailto:owner-canslim@lists.xmission.com]On Behalf Of Sam Funchess
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2002 3:37 PM
To: canslim@lists.xmission.com
Subject: Re: [CANSLIM] Now Xerox?
Canslim Members,
Been a while since my last post.
With that being said, I think the "scandal's" are very good for the long
term benefit of CANSLIMers and the market. Its been a while since I've read
HTMMIS so I can't quote chapters or such, but I recall him talking a lot
about the fear factor. We have not had the "Fear" in the market yet. I
think that there is no sustainable upside to the market until the fear has
hit the market.
Just my thoughts.
Sam
Katherine Malm wrote:
Here's some background on earnings from Briefing.com for those less
familiar with EBITDA, etc. --Katherine PS Xerox's accounting woes go back
*years*.... P-U....==========
The Earnings Confidence Problem - Part I
25-Jun-02 14:18 ET
[BRIEFING.COM - Robert V. Green] In the midst of the more scandalous
market problems, the earnings confidence problem is not receiving the
attention it should. Here is more on the topic.
The Market Problems
The current market suffers from the following ailments:
a.. Distrust of management - from excessive comp to outright
fraud. Tyco is the best example.
b.. Distrust of accounting - Andersen
c.. Distrust of analysts - Blodgett
These three problems get all the press and attention.
But a deeper problem is afflicting the buy side - a growing concern
about the validity of earnings reporting.
The Earnings Problem
Accounting rules have always been flexible enough to allow most
companies a far amount of flexibility both in revenue recognition and
expense recognition. Even when earnings reporting was somewhat standardized,
some companies were criticized for how they recognized revenue and expense.
But in the last five years, the types of earnings that companies
have driven Wall Street to focus upon have become questionable.
There are four different basic types of earnings today:
a.. GAAP earnings: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles - A
standards board that publishes rules on how expenses should be booked.
Generally, all types of expenses are deducted.
b.. As reported: Earnings excluding extraordinary items (as
defined by GAAP), changes in accounting charges, charges related to
discontinued operations (plant closings, etc.)
c.. Operating earnings: As reported earnings but excluding
"one-time" charges which do not fit the GAAP definition of "extraordinary"
d.. Proforma earnings: Loosely defined "as if" analysis.
Originally designed to provide comparison data for mergers.
GAAP accounting principles are guidelines for accountants, not
investors. The GAAP standards are guidelines for how a company should keep
its books, not how the company should report earnings.
For example, a basic principle behind GAAP is that revenue must be
booked over the time period for which services and product are delivered. If
a two year $200,000 contract is pre-paid in cash, up front, the entire
$200,000 cannot be booked in the quarter in which the contract is signed.
However, the revenue does not have to be booked as $25,000 per quarter for
two years. A fair amount of flexibility, sometimes negotiated by auditors,
is possible for how much of a contract can be booked in each quarter.
GAAP covers expenses as well as revenues, of course.
As reported earnings are the historical standard for earnings. Until
the mid-eighties, in fact, there was little debate over how earnings should
be reported as everyone used "as reported" earnings as a standard. For the
most part, there was no difference between "as reported" earnings and any
other methodology because one-time charges were not as common. Furthermore,
companies did not actively seek, as they do today, to have certain expenses
classified as "one-time."
Operating earnings are designed to allow comparisons between
quarters and years for a company. One time charges in any quarter are
excluded because these would distort the comparison. Operating earnings
became important when it became clear that Wall Street would completely
ignore any "one-time" charges, and focus solely on earnings growth. This
provided a strong incentive for companies to classify large expenses as
one-time charges.
An example of one company's aggressive attempt to get charges
classified as one-time was Excite's 1997 $40 million marketing deal with
Netscape. Now long forgotten, Excite paid Netscape up-front for a four-year
deal to be the principal search engine at the Netscape web site. Excite
tried to classify the entire $40 million payment as a one-time charge in a
single quarter. By doing so, Excite was almost profitable. At Briefing we
highlighted this event as an indicator of the times. The SEC later forced
Excite to restate the payment as a four-year expense. But many, many
companies were successful in getting major expense outlays classified as
"one-time" which improved income statements.
The focus on operating expenses led to the development of the
"EBITDA" concept, which is "Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation,
and Amortization." The EBITDA concept, which has to be calculated from the
line items shown on an operating earnings report, was designed to show the
basic business model of the company, without regard to cost-of-capital. If
capital were free, then EBITDA would be earnings.
The focus on EBITDA has fallen from favor in recent times for one
single reason: Interest. The interest payments on bonds, which are excluded
from EBITDA calculations, has ruined many debt-ridden.
Only through focusing on EBITDA projections could a company like
Exodus Communications raise so much debt that their interest payments
exceeded their gross margin. That won't happen again for decades.
Pro-forma earnings are very hard to define today. The original
purpose of pro-forma earnings calculations was to show the effects of a
merger in a format that allowed a single income statement to combine only
the operating models of each company, and exclude the actual costs of making
the merger.
Under the pro-forma for merger guidelines, pro-forma calculations
could only be used for one year, after which the company should start
reporting as-reported earnings for the combined entities.
However, companies soon learned that as long as they made a new
merger each year, they could continue reporting pro-forma earnings
indefinitely. This "flexibility" in how earnings could be reported led to
"pro-forma" meanings that were never intended, including stock option
compensation expenses and R&D "in-progress" write-offs.
The Erosion of Earnings Confidence
The now long-departed CFO of Amazon.com, Joy Covey, was the unsung
hero of bringing pro-forma earnings to the popularity they enjoyed. She did
so by diverting attention away from standardized earnings reports.
Ms. Covey invented the concept of "EBITMA" which was defined "EBITDA
plus marketing." She was successful in convincing Wall Street that marketing
costs were equivalent to capital investment, a concept which looks
ridiculous in retrospect. But in the early days of the internet, marketing
and brand development was equated with capturing "territory" which,
presumably, everyone thought could never be lost. (Tell that to investors in
Excite.)
Nevertheless, Joy Covey was successful in convincing investors,
particularly convertible bond investors, to focus on the EBITMA concept. It
was a crucial element in selling the $2 billion in Amazon.com bonds that
built the company. After all, if you ignore the interest payments on the
bond, and you consider spending the bond principal on marketing as "not an
expense," Amazon's income statement would look great!.
The problem, of course, is that bond holders don't care about
earnings statements. They just care about the payments. The jury is still
out on whether Amazon.com will eventually be able to pay the principal on
their bonds. (See the Stock Brief of: 14-May-01 Amazon.com's Bond Problem.
After Joy Covey established the principle of EBITMA, internet
companies began using all types of non-earnings related statistics to show
growth. Page views, registered users, unique monthly visitors are just some
of the meaningless examples that became popular. (Surely you remember.)
When "non-revenue statistics" becoming drivers of stock prices,
(around 1998) pro-forma earnings increased in popularity. After all, a
pro-forma income statement that showed some kind of earnings progress looked
a lot more "real" than the phony statistics being coughed up by internet
companies.
But when the bubble collapsed, everyone began questioning earnings
quality. It didn't happen overnight, and it didn't happen all at once. But
as a long, slow evolutionary force, earnings confidence has eroded, and is
still present today.
The Aftermath
The evolution of earnings focus over the past 10 years has led us to
today's situation: a basic lack of confidence in many companies income
statements.
Amazon.com still reports earnings on a pro-forma basis. In their Q1
income statement, you can take your choice of earnings:
a.. Pro-forma: $25 million profit
b.. Operating: $2 million profit
c.. Net (as-reported): $(23) million loss
The earnings format you choose is not relevant, frankly. It is far
more important to the stock value what format the guy next to you chooses.
After all, value to you is primarily determined by what someone else
will pay, not by what you pay.
Even GE
Even solid companies like General Electric have come under scrutiny
because of the extremely complex financial situations. Unraveling a GE
earnings report has now become a major task. Where GE only had to beat
earnings estimates by $0.01 each quarter to count on an ever increasing
stock price, today that is not enough.
GE stock is down 50% in the last two years despite having only
missed one earnings estimate in the last four years and having continual
year-over-year growth in earnings averaging 15%.
This bears repeating: GE, as representative a stock as you can get
of the overall economy, is down 50% since September 2000. During that time
period, they have grown earnings at over 11% (year-to-year basis) and beat
or met earnings estimates every quarter except one. The one shortfall was
October 2001, the quarter of the Attack on America and GE was only one penny
short.
Why can't GE get any respect? The only definable long-term culprit
is a decline in confidence in GE's earnings numbers. During the same eight
quarter time-period, GE revenue growth rate has been consistently falling.
From a growth rate of 24% and 20% in 00Q1 and 00Q2, growth has steadily
fallen, and even was negative for most of 2001.
Flat or declining revenue combined with continuing increasing
earnings leads to only one conclusion: you can't keep this up forever.
Eventually, GE will be unable to book the earnings number higher than
previous years. When (if), that happens, GE stock will be further
devastated. Until then, the slow erosion of confidence causes the stock
price to decline.
GE is just one good example of how confidence in earnings numbers
has been eroding over time since the bubble collapse. Until greater
confidence in earnings numbers is established, you can expect further
difficulties in the market overall.
Standard & Poors is now pushing for a standardized calculation for
earnings reporting, called Core Earnings. We will have more on this concept
in Part II of this story, to appear later this week.
Comments may be emailed to the author, Robert V. Green, at
rvgreen@briefing.com
----- Original Message -----
From: Winston Little
To: canslim@lists.xmission.com
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2002 9:47 AM
Subject: Re: [CANSLIM] Now Xerox?
They all used EBITDA.. which Warren Buffett in May said is the currency
of a
crook ... they all have a smell about them.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Kelly Short" <kelly.short@neoris.com>
To: <canslim@lists.xmission.com>
Sent: Friday, June 28, 2002 9:46 AM
Subject: [CANSLIM] Now Xerox?
Enron, WorldCom- nothing. Xerox off by $6B. (Yes- that's "B" as in boy!)
Kelly
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<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D590050820-28062002>Sam, </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D590050820-28062002></SPAN></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN class=3D590050820-28062002>I =
agree with you=20
with one exception. Capitulation and Fear seem to work only in =
'Bull'=20
Markets. In a true bear, like the one we're in, it will be =
like=20
bleeding with a thousand cuts. It will go on and on until no one =
gives a=20
crap anymore. Look at all the times before, =
when we had=20
thought confirmation of the magical (2-5 day) FT. My gut =
tells=20
me to Watch out for the coming earnings season - for some pleasant but a =
lot=20
more NASTY surprises. </SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D590050820-28062002></SPAN></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN class=3D590050820-28062002>Also =
on a side note,=20
does anyone care about CFOs managing earnings to the downside? =
Meaning=20
specifically guiding lower in a bad market with the intention of beating =
and=20
bloating future quarterly earnings? Have there been specific =
cases? =20
Microsoft has consistently been accused of 'managing=20
earnings.'</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D590050820-28062002></SPAN></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D590050820-28062002>Rocky</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><FONT =
face=3DTahoma=20
size=3D2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B>=20
owner-canslim@lists.xmission.com =
[mailto:owner-canslim@lists.xmission.com]<B>On=20
Behalf Of </B>Sam Funchess<BR><B>Sent:</B> Friday, June 28, 2002 3:37=20
PM<BR><B>To:</B> canslim@lists.xmission.com<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: =
[CANSLIM] Now=20
Xerox?<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>Canslim Members,=20
<P>Been a while since my last post.=20
<P>With that being said, I think the "scandal's" are very good for the =
long term=20
benefit of CANSLIMers and the market. Its been a while since I've =
read=20
HTMMIS so I can't quote chapters or such, but I recall him talking a lot =
about=20
the fear factor. We have not had the "Fear" in the market =
yet. I=20
think that there is no sustainable upside to the market until the fear =
has hit=20
the market.=20
<P>Just my thoughts. <BR><BR>Sam=20
<P>Katherine Malm wrote:=20
<BLOCKQUOTE TYPE=3D"CITE">
<STYLE></STYLE>
Here's some background on earnings from Briefing.com for those less =
familiar=20
with EBITDA, etc. --Katherine PS Xerox's accounting woes go =
back=20
*years*.... P-U....=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D =20
<TABLE cellSpacing=3D0 cellPadding=3D4 width=3D"100%">
<CAPTION>
<TBODY><BR></TBODY></CAPTION>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD class=3Dheader>The Earnings Confidence Problem - Part =
I</TD></TR>
<TR>
<TD><B><FONT face=3DVerdana><FONT size=3D-2>25-Jun-02 14:18=20
ET</FONT></FONT></B></TD></TR>
<TR>
<TD height=3D8></TD></TR>
<TR>
<TD>[BRIEFING.COM - Robert V. Green] In the midst of the more =
scandalous=20
market problems, the earnings confidence problem is not =
receiving the=20
attention it should. Here is more on the topic. =20
<H3>The Market Problems</H3>The current market suffers from the=20
following ailments: =20
<UL>
<LI>Distrust of management - from excessive comp to outright =
fraud.=20
Tyco is the best example. =20
<LI>Distrust of accounting - Andersen =20
<LI>Distrust of analysts - Blodgett </LI></UL>These three =
problems get=20
all the press and attention. =20
<P>But a deeper problem is afflicting the buy side - a growing =
concern=20
about the validity of earnings reporting. =20
<H3>The Earnings Problem</H3>Accounting rules have always been =
flexible=20
enough to allow most companies a far amount of flexibility both =
in=20
revenue recognition and expense recognition. Even when earnings=20
reporting was somewhat standardized, some companies were =
criticized for=20
how they recognized revenue and expense.=20
<P>But in the last five years, the <I>types</I> of earnings that =
companies have driven Wall Street to focus upon have become=20
questionable. =20
<P>There are four different basic types of earnings today:=20
<UL>
<LI>GAAP earnings: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles - =
A=20
standards board that publishes rules on how expenses should be =
booked.=20
Generally, all types of expenses are deducted. =20
<LI>As reported: Earnings excluding extraordinary items (as =
defined by=20
GAAP), changes in accounting charges, charges related to =
discontinued=20
operations (plant closings, etc.) =20
<LI>Operating earnings: As reported earnings but excluding =
"one-time"=20
charges which do not fit the GAAP definition of =
"extraordinary" =20
<LI>Proforma earnings: Loosely defined "as if" analysis. =
Originally=20
designed to provide comparison data for mergers. =
</LI></UL><B>GAAP</B>=20
accounting principles are guidelines for accountants, not =
investors. The=20
GAAP standards are guidelines for how a company should keep its =
books,=20
not how the company should report earnings. =20
<P>For example, a basic principle behind GAAP is that revenue =
must be=20
booked over the time period for which services and product are=20
delivered. If a two year $200,000 contract is pre-paid in cash, =
up=20
front, the entire $200,000 cannot be booked in the quarter in =
which the=20
contract is signed. However, the revenue does not have to be =
booked as=20
$25,000 per quarter for two years. A fair amount of flexibility, =
sometimes negotiated by auditors, is possible for how much of a =
contract=20
can be booked in each quarter. =20
<P>GAAP covers expenses as well as revenues, of course. =20
<P><B>As reported</B> earnings are the historical standard for =
earnings.=20
Until the mid-eighties, in fact, there was little debate over =
how=20
earnings should be reported as everyone used "as reported" =
earnings as a=20
standard. For the most part, there was no difference between "as =
reported" earnings and any other methodology because one-time =
charges=20
were not as common. Furthermore, companies did not actively =
seek, as=20
they do today, to have certain expenses classified as =
"one-time." =20
<P><B>Operating earnings</B> are designed to allow comparisons =
between=20
quarters and years for a company. One time charges in any =
quarter are=20
excluded because these would distort the comparison. Operating =
earnings=20
became important when it became clear that Wall Street would =
completely=20
ignore any "one-time" charges, and focus solely on earnings =
growth. This=20
provided a strong incentive for companies to classify large =
expenses as=20
one-time charges. =20
<P>An example of one company's aggressive attempt to get charges =
classified as one-time was Excite's 1997 $40 million marketing =
deal with=20
Netscape. Now long forgotten, Excite paid Netscape up-front for =
a=20
four-year deal to be the principal search engine at the Netscape =
web=20
site. Excite tried to classify the entire $40 million payment as =
a=20
one-time charge in a single quarter. By doing so, Excite was =
almost=20
profitable. At Briefing we highlighted this event as an =
indicator of the=20
times. The SEC later forced Excite to restate the payment as a =
four-year=20
expense. But many, many companies were successful in getting =
major=20
expense outlays classified as "one-time" which improved income=20
statements. =20
<P>The focus on operating expenses led to the development of the =
"EBITDA" concept, which is "Earnings Before Interest, Taxes,=20
Depreciation, and Amortization." The EBITDA concept, which has =
to be=20
calculated from the line items shown on an operating earnings =
report,=20
was designed to show the basic business model of the company, =
without=20
regard to cost-of-capital. If capital were free, then EBITDA =
would be=20
earnings. =20
<P>The focus on EBITDA has fallen from favor in recent times for =
one=20
single reason: <I>Interest.</I> The interest payments on bonds, =
which=20
are excluded from EBITDA calculations, has ruined many=20
debt-ridden. =20
<P>Only through focusing on EBITDA projections could a company =
like=20
Exodus Communications raise so much debt that their interest =
payments=20
exceeded their gross margin. That won't happen again for =
decades. =20
<P><B>Pro-forma earnings</B> are very hard to define today. The =
original=20
purpose of pro-forma earnings calculations was to show the =
effects of a=20
merger in a format that allowed a single income statement to =
combine=20
only the operating models of each company, and exclude the =
actual costs=20
of making the merger. =20
<P>Under the pro-forma for merger guidelines, pro-forma =
calculations=20
could only be used for one year, after which the company should =
start=20
reporting as-reported earnings for the combined entities. =20
<P>However, companies soon learned that as long as they made a =
new=20
merger each year, they could continue reporting pro-forma =
earnings=20
indefinitely. This "flexibility" in how earnings could be =
reported led=20
to "pro-forma" meanings that were never intended, including =
stock option=20
compensation expenses and R&D "in-progress" =
write-offs. =20
<H3>The Erosion of Earnings Confidence</H3>The now long-departed =
CFO of=20
Amazon.com, Joy Covey, was the unsung hero of bringing pro-forma =
earnings to the popularity they enjoyed. She did so by diverting =
attention away from standardized earnings reports. =20
<P>Ms. Covey invented the concept of "EBITMA" which was defined =
"EBITDA=20
plus marketing." She was successful in convincing Wall Street =
that=20
<I>marketing costs were equivalent to capital investment,</I> a =
concept=20
which looks ridiculous in retrospect. But in the early days of =
the=20
internet, marketing and brand development was equated with =
capturing=20
"territory" which, presumably, everyone thought could never be =
lost.=20
(Tell that to investors in Excite.) =20
<P>Nevertheless, Joy Covey was successful in convincing =
investors,=20
particularly convertible bond investors, to focus on the EBITMA =
concept.=20
It was a crucial element in selling the $2 billion in Amazon.com =
bonds=20
that built the company. After all, if you ignore the interest =
payments=20
on the bond, and you consider spending the bond principal on =
marketing=20
as "not an expense," Amazon's income statement would look =
great!. =20
<P>The problem, of course, is that bond holders don't care about =
earnings statements. They just care about the payments. The jury =
is=20
still out on whether Amazon.com will eventually be able to pay =
the=20
principal on their bonds. (See the Stock Brief of: <A=20
=
href=3D"http://www.briefing.com/scripts/sub/stocks/PowerAnchor.asp?varArt=
icleID=3DSB20010514082806rvgreen">14-May-01=20
Amazon.com's Bond Problem.</A>=20
<P>After Joy Covey established the principle of EBITMA, internet =
companies began using all types of non-earnings related =
statistics to=20
show growth. Page views, registered users, unique monthly =
visitors are=20
just some of the meaningless examples that became popular. =
(Surely you=20
remember.)=20
<P>When "non-revenue statistics" becoming drivers of stock =
prices,=20
(around 1998) pro-forma earnings increased in popularity. After =
all, a=20
pro-forma income statement that showed <I>some kind of =
earnings</I>=20
progress looked a lot more "real" than the phony statistics =
being=20
coughed up by internet companies. =20
<P>But when the bubble collapsed, <I>everyone </I>began =
questioning=20
earnings quality. It didn't happen overnight, and it didn't =
happen all=20
at once. But as a long, slow evolutionary force, earnings =
confidence has=20
eroded, and is still present today. =20
<H3>The Aftermath</H3>The evolution of earnings focus over the =
past 10=20
years has led us to today's situation: a basic lack of =
confidence in=20
many companies income statements. =20
<P>Amazon.com still reports earnings on a pro-forma basis. In =
their Q1=20
income statement, you can take your choice of earnings: =20
<UL>
<LI>Pro-forma: $25 million profit =20
<LI>Operating: $2 million profit =20
<LI>Net (as-reported): $(23) million loss </LI></UL>The =
earnings format=20
<I>you choose</I> is not relevant, frankly. It is far more =
important to=20
the stock value what format <I>the guy next to you chooses.</I>=20
<P>After all, value <I>to you</I> is primarily determined by =
what=20
someone else will pay, not by what you pay. =20
<H3>Even GE</H3>Even solid companies like General Electric have =
come=20
under scrutiny because of the extremely complex financial =
situations.=20
Unraveling a GE earnings report has now become a major task. =
Where GE=20
only had to beat earnings estimates by $0.01 each quarter to =
count on an=20
ever increasing stock price, today that is not enough.=20
<P><I>GE stock is down 50% in the last two years despite having =
only=20
missed one earnings estimate in the last four years and having =
continual=20
year-over-year growth in earnings averaging 15%. </I>=20
<P>This bears repeating: GE, as representative a stock as you =
can get of=20
the overall economy, is down 50% since September 2000. During =
that time=20
period, they have grown earnings at over 11% (year-to-year =
basis) and=20
beat or met earnings estimates every quarter except one. The one =
shortfall was October 2001, the quarter of the Attack on America =
and GE=20
was only one penny short. =20
<P>Why can't GE get any respect? The only definable long-term =
culprit is=20
a decline in confidence in GE's earnings numbers. During the =
same eight=20
quarter time-period, GE revenue growth rate has been =
consistently=20
falling. From a growth rate of 24% and 20% in 00Q1 and 00Q2, =
growth has=20
steadily fallen, and even was negative for most of 2001. =20
<P>Flat or declining revenue combined with continuing increasing =
earnings leads to only one conclusion: <I>you can't keep this up =
forever. </I>Eventually, GE will be unable to book the earnings =
number=20
higher than previous years. When (if), that happens, GE stock =
will be=20
further devastated. Until then, the slow erosion of confidence =
causes=20
the stock price to decline.=20
<P>GE is just one good example of how confidence in earnings =
numbers has=20
been eroding over time since the bubble collapse. Until greater=20
confidence in earnings numbers is established, you can expect =
further=20
difficulties in the market overall. =20
<P>Standard & Poors is now pushing for a standardized =
calculation=20
for earnings reporting, called Core Earnings. We will have more =
on this=20
concept in Part II of this story, to appear later this week.=20
<P>Comments may be emailed to the author, Robert V. Green, at <A =
=
href=3D"mailto:rvgreen@briefing.com">rvgreen@briefing.com</A><!--(RVG)-->=
</P></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; =
BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message -----</DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: =
black"><B>From:</B>=20
<A title=3Dwlittle1@peoplepc.com =
href=3D"mailto:wlittle1@peoplepc.com">Winston=20
Little</A></DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A =
title=3Dcanslim@lists.xmission.com=20
=
href=3D"mailto:canslim@lists.xmission.com">canslim@lists.xmission.com</A>=
</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Friday, June 28, 2002 =
9:47=20
AM</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> Re: [CANSLIM] Now=20
Xerox?</DIV> They all used EBITDA.. which Warren Buffett in May =
said is=20
the currency of a <BR>crook ... they all have a smell about them.=20
<P>----- Original Message ----- <BR>From: "Kelly Short" <<A=20
=
href=3D"mailto:kelly.short@neoris.com">kelly.short@neoris.com</A>> =
<BR>To:=20
<<A=20
=
href=3D"mailto:canslim@lists.xmission.com">canslim@lists.xmission.com</A>=
>=20
<BR>Sent: Friday, June 28, 2002 9:46 AM <BR>Subject: [CANSLIM] Now =
Xerox?=20
<BR> =20
<P>Enron, WorldCom- nothing. Xerox off by $6B. (Yes- that's "B" as =
in boy!)=20
<P>Kelly <BR> </P></BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE>- -To =
subscribe/unsubscribe,=20
email "majordomo@xmission.com" -In the email body, write "subscribe =
canslim" or=20
- -"unsubscribe canslim". Do not use quotes in your email. </BODY></HTML>
- ------=_NextPart_000_0185_01C21EC0.22BB9CB0--
- -
- -To subscribe/unsubscribe, email "majordomo@xmission.com"
- -In the email body, write "subscribe canslim" or
- -"unsubscribe canslim". Do not use quotes in your email.
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